at you, this character, that we may no longer use
in the schools the examples of the ancients, but may have some example
of our own.
To whom then does the contemplation of these matters (philosophical
inquiries) belong? To him who has leisure, for man is an animal that
loves contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate these things as
runaway slaves do; we should sit, as in a theatre, free from
distraction, and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another time
to the lute-player; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave has
taken his station he praises the actor and at the same time looks round;
then if any one calls out his master's name, the slave is immediately
frightened and disturbed. It is shameful for philosophers thus to
contemplate the works of nature. For what is a master? Man is not the
master of man; but death is, and life and pleasure and pain; for if he
comes without these things, bring Caesar to me and you will see how firm
I am. But when he shall come with these things, thundering and
lightning, and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except to
recognize my master like the runaway slave? But so long as I have any
respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the theatre, so
do I. I bathe, I drink, I sing; but all this I do with terror and
uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters, that is from
those things by means of which masters are formidable, what further
trouble have I, what master have I still?
What then, ought we to publish these things to all men? No, but we ought
to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant ([Greek: tois idiotais]) and to
say: "This man recommends to me that which he thinks good for himself. I
excuse him." For Socrates also excused the jailer who had the charge of
him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to drink the
poison, and said, "How generously he laments over us." Does he then say
to the jailer that for this reason we have sent away the women? No, but
he says it to his friends who were able to hear (understand) it; and he
treats the jailer as a child.
* * * * *
THAT CONFIDENCE (COURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION.--The opinion
of the philosophers perhaps seem to some to be a paradox; but still let
us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do
everything both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to
be in a manner contrary to confid
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