of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of
the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only
"seems," and a certain investigation of that which "seems" whether it
"seems" rightly, and a discovery of some rule ([Greek: chanonos]), as we
have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a
carpenter's rule (or square) in the case of straight and crooked
things.--This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that all
things are right which seem so to all? And how is it possible that
contradictions can be right?--Not all then, but all which seem to us to
be right.--How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians?
why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what seems
right to me or to any other man? Not at all more. What then "seems" to
every man is not sufficient for determining what "is"; for neither in
the case of weights nor measures are we satisfied with the bare
appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In this
matter then is there no rule superior to what "seems"? And how is it
possible that the most necessary things among men should have no sign
(mark), and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some rule.
And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards use
it without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger without
it? For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of
their madness those who use mere "seeming" as a measure, and misuse it;
so that for the future proceeding from certain things (principles) known
and made clear we may use in the case of particular things the
preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.
What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring?
Pleasure (for example). Subject it to the rule, throw it into the
balance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have
confidence in it? Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to be.
Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? No. Is then pleasure
anything secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of the scale, and
drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you are not
sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring another. Is
it fit to be elated over what is good? Yes. Is it proper then to be
elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that it is proper;
but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of the balan
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