of the soul, the substance (nature) of the good is discovered; for good
cannot be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted
another thing; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that which
comes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes after may
be good, that which precedes must be good. But you would not affirm
this, if you are in your right mind, for you would then say what is
inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. It
remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure from
things of the body; and again that those bodily things must be the
things which precede and the substance (nature) of the good.

Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by making
them your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which have
such persuasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the
persuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy as
this which helps to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this
end, what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic art which is
the best part? the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the hand
is the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal part (that which
precedes and leads the rest). The duties then are also three: those
which are directed towards the existence of a thing; those which are
directed towards its existence in a particular kind; and third, the
chief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to value
the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things, [Greek:
ta proaegoumena]). What are these? Engaging in public business,
marrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents,
and generally, having desires, aversions ([Greek: echchlinein]),
pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do
these things, and according to our nature. And how are we constituted by
nature? Free, noble, modest; for what other animal blushes? what other
is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) of shame? and we
are so constituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these things, as
a minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our activity, in
order that it may keep us constant in acts which are conformable to
nature.

* * * * *

HOW WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEARANCES ([Greek:
phantasias]).--As we exercise ourselves against sophistical