condition conformable to nature,
and progress was made. Do not then mix things which are different, and
do not expect, when you are laboring at one thing to make progress in
another. But see if any man among us when he is intent upon this, the
keeping himself in a state conformable to nature and living so always,
does not make progress. For you will not find such a man.
It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to hold
(soft) cheese with a hook. But those who have a good natural
disposition, even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to
reason.
* * * * *
TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN.--When the
administrator came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean, Epictetus
said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire of you who
are philosophers, as those who come to a strange city inquire of the
citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is the best thing in
the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go in quest of that
which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities.
For that there are three things which relate to man--soul, body, and
things external, scarcely any man denies. It remains for you
philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we say to men? Is
the flesh the best? and was it for this that Maximus sailed as far as
Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied him
that he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man said that it was
not, and added, Far be that from him. Is it not fit then, Epictetus
said, to be actively employed about the best? It is certainly of all
things the most fit. What then do we possess which is better than the
flesh? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the best, are they
better, or the good things of the worse? The good things of the best.
And are the good things of the best within the power of the will or not
within the power of the will? They are within the power of the will. Is
then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power of the will? It
is, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? But
that cannot be conceived; for there must first exist a certain substance
or nature ([Greek: ousia]) of good, by obtaining which we shall have
pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On what then shall we
depend for this pleasure of the soul? for if it shall depend on things
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