ssia, in her turn became jealous of the connection of France with
Austria; England had wasted millions unsuccessfully in attempting to
prevent the family compact with Spain; Russia disliked the alliance
between France and Turkey; and Turkey became apprehensive of the
inclination of France towards an alliance with Russia. Sometimes the
quadruple alliance alarmed some of the powers, and at other times a
contrary system alarmed others, and in all those cases the charge was
always made against the intrigues of the Bourbons.

Admitting those matters to be true, the only thing that could have
quieted the apprehensions of all those powers with respect to the
interference of France, would have been her entire NEUTRALITY in Europe;
but this was impossible to be obtained, or if obtained was impossible
to be secured, because the genius of her government was repugnant to all
such restrictions.

It now happens that by entirely changing the genius of her government,
which France has done for herself, this neutrality, which neither wars
could accomplish nor treaties secure, arises naturally of itself, and
becomes the ground upon which the war should terminate. It is the
thing that approaches the nearest of all others to what ought to be the
political views of all the European powers; and there is nothing that
can so effectually secure this neutrality, as that the genius of the
French government should be different from the rest of Europe.

But if their object is to restore the Bourbons and monarchy together,
they will unavoidably restore with it all the evils of which they have
complained; and the first question of discord will be, whose ally is
that monarchy to be?

Will England agree to the restoration of the family compact against
which she has been fighting and scheming ever since it existed? Will
Prussia agree to restore the alliance between France and Austria, or
will Austria agree to restore the former connection between France and
Prussia, formed on purpose to oppose herself; or will Spain or Russia,
or any of the maritime powers, agree that France and her navy should be
allied to England? In fine, will any of the powers agree to strengthen
the hands of the other against itself? Yet all these cases involve
themselves in the original question of the restoration of the Bourbons;
and on the other hand, all of them disappear by the neutrality of
France.

If their object is not to restore the Bourbons, it must be the
impracti