then lie at the mercy of the
other, and the ports of any nation in Europe might be blocked up.

The geographical situation of those two maritime powers comes next under
consideration. Each of them occupies one entire side of the channel from
the straits of Dover and Calais to the opening into the Atlantic. The
commerce of all the northern nations, from Holland to Russia, must pass
the straits of Dover and Calais, and along the Channel, to arrive at the
Atlantic.

This being the case, the systematical politics of all the nations,
northward of the straits of Dover and Calais, can be ascertained from
their geographical situation; for it is necessary to the safety of their
commerce that the two sides of the Channel, either in whole or in part,
should not be in the possession either of England or France. While one
nation possesses the whole of one side, and the other nation the other
side, the northern nations cannot help seeing that in any situation of
things their commerce will always find protection on one side or the
other. It may sometimes be that of England and sometimes that of France.

Again, while the English navy continues in its present condition, it is
necessary that another navy should exist to controul the universal sway
the former would otherwise have over the commerce of all nations. France
is the only nation in Europe where this balance can be placed. The
navies of the North, were they sufficiently powerful, could not be
sufficiently operative. They are blocked up by the ice six months in the
year. Spain lies too remote; besides which, it is only for the sake of
her American mines that she keeps up her navy.

Applying these cases to the project of a partition of France, it will
appear, that the project involves with it a DESTRUCTION OF THE BALANCE
OF MARITIME POWER; because it is only by keeping France entire and
indivisible that the balance can be kept up. This is a case that at
first sight lies remote and almost hidden. But it interests all the
maritime and commercial nations in Europe in as great a degree as any
case that has ever come before them.--In short, it is with war as it
is with law. In law, the first merits of the case become lost in the
multitude of arguments; and in war they become lost in the variety of
events. New objects arise that take the lead of all that went before,
and everything assumes a new aspect. This was the case in the last great
confederacy in what is called the succession w