d this was in Buell's mind.
On the other hand, Lincoln's object was a wise one in itself and would
have been worth some postponement of the advance along the Mississippi
if thereby the army in the West could have been used in support of it.
However this may be, the fact is that Lincoln's plan, as it stood, was
backed up by McClellan; McClellan was perhaps unduly anxious for Buell
to move on Eastern Tennessee, because this would have supported the
invasion of Virginia which he himself was now contemplating, and he was
probably forgetful of the West; but he was Lincoln's highest military
adviser and his capacity was still trusted. Buell's own view was that,
when he moved, it should be towards Western Tennessee. He would have
had a railway connection behind him all his way, and Albert Johnston's
army would have lain before him. He wished that Halleck meanwhile
should advance up the courses of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers;
Eastern Tennessee (he may have thought) would be in the end more
effectively succoured; their two armies would thus have converged on
Johnston's. Halleck agreed with Buell to the extent of disagreeing
with Lincoln and McClellan, but no further. He declined to move in
concert with Buell. Fremont had disorganised the army of the West, and
Halleck, till he had repaired the mischief, permitted only certain
minor enterprises under his command.

Each of the three generals, including the General-in-Chief, who was the
Government's chief adviser, was set upon his own immediate purpose, and
indisposed to understanding the situation of the others--Buell perhaps
the least so. Each of them had at first a very sound reason, the
unreadiness of his army, for being in no hurry to move, but then each
of them soon appeared to be a slow or unenterprising commander. Buell
was perhaps unlucky in this, for his whole conduct is the subject of
some controversy; but he did appear slow, and the two others, it is
universally agreed, really were so. As 1861 drew to a close, it became
urgent that something should be done somewhere, even if it were not
done in the best possible direction. The political pressure upon the
Administration became as great as before Bull Run. The army of the
Potomac had rapidly become a fine army, and its enemy, in no way
superior, lay entrenching at Manassas, twenty miles in front of it.
When Lincoln grew despondent and declared that "if something was not
done soon, the bottom would drop o