nal direction. His corps
commanders led assaults on Lee's position at different times and in so
disconnected a manner that each was repulsed singly. But on the
following morning Lee found himself in a situation which determined him
to retreat.

As a military success the battle of Antietam demanded to be followed
up. Reinforcements had now come to McClellan, and Lincoln telegraphed,
"Please do not let him get off without being hurt." Lee was between
the broad Potomac and a Northern army fully twice as large as his own,
with other large forces near. McClellan's subordinates urged him to
renew the attack and drive Lee into the river. But Lee was allowed to
cross the river, and McClellan lay camped on the Antietam battlefield
for a fortnight. He may have been dissatisfied with the condition of
his army and its supplies. Some of his men wanted new boots; many of
Lee's were limping barefoot. He certainly, as often before,
exaggerated the strength of his enemy. Lee recrossed the Potomac
little damaged. Lincoln, occupied in those days over the most
momentous act of his political life, watched McClellan eagerly, and
came to the Antietam to see things for himself. He came back in the
full belief that McClellan would move at once. Once more undeceived,
he pressed him with letters and telegrams from himself and Halleck. He
was convinced that McClellan, if he tried, could cut off Lee from
Richmond. Hearing of the fatigue of McClellan's horses, he telegraphed
about the middle of October, "Will you pardon me for asking what your
horses have done since the battle of Antietam that tires anything."
This was unkind; McClellan indeed should have seen about cavalry in the
days when he was organising in Washington, but at this moment the
Southern horse had just raided right round his lines and got safe back,
and his own much inferior cavalry was probably worn out with vain
pursuit of them. On the same day Lincoln wrote more kindly, "My dear
Sir, you remember my speaking to you of what I called your
over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you
cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Change positions with
the enemy, and think you not, he would break your communications with
Richmond within the next twenty-four hours." And after a brief
analysis of the situation, which seems conclusive, he ends: "I say
'try'; if we never try we shall never succeed. . . . If we cannot beat
him now when he bears