entirely irreproachable as to
afford lively satisfaction. More than this, it may be conjectured that
to a certain standard of honour, loyalty, and patriotism, which he set
consciously before himself, he would always have been devotedly true.
But if it be asked further whether McClellan was the desired instrument
for Lincoln's and the country's needs, and whether, as the saying is,
he was a man to go tiger-hunting with, something very much against him,
though hard to define, appears in every part of his record (except
indeed, one performance in his Peninsular Campaign). Did he ever do
his best to beat the enemy? Did he ever, except for a moment,
concentrate himself singly upon any great object? Were even his
preparations thorough? Was his information ever accurate? Was his
purpose in the war ever definite, and, if so, made plain to his
Government? Was he often betrayed into marked frankness, or into
marked generosity? No one would be ready to answer yes to any of these
questions. McClellan fills so memorable a place in American history
that he demands such a label as can be given to him. In the most
moving and the most authentic of all Visions of Judgment, men were not
set on the right hand or the left according as they were of
irreproachable or reproachable character; they were divided into those
who did and those who did not. In the provisional judgment which men,
if they make it modestly, should at times make with decision,
McClellan's place is clear. The quality, "spiacente a Dio ed ai nemici
suoi," of the men who did not, ran through and through him.

Lincoln required first a general who would make no fatal blunder, but
he required too, when he could find him, a general of undaunted
enterprise; he did not wish to expose the North to disaster, but he did
mean to conquer the South. There was some security in employing
McClellan, though employing him did at one time throw on Lincoln's
unfit shoulders the task of defending Washington. It proved very hard
to find another general equally trustworthy. But, in the light of
facts which Lincoln came to perceive, it proved impossible to consider
McClellan as the man to finish the war.

We need only notice the doings of the main armies in this theatre of
the war and take no account of various minor affairs at outlying posts.
From the battle of Bull Run, which was on July 21, 1861, to March 5,
1862, the Southern army under Joseph Johnston lay quietly drilling at