climate of the coming months if they had to wait long
where they were. He was also disturbed by McClellan's vagueness about
the number of his men, for he now returned as present for duty a number
which far exceeded that which some of his recent telegrams had given
and yet fell short of the number sent him by an amount which no
reasonable estimate of killed, wounded, and sick could explain. This
added to Lincoln's doubt on the main question presented to him.
McClellan believed that he could take Richmond, but he demanded for
this very large reinforcements. Some part of them were already being
collected, but the rest could by no means be given him without leaving
Washington with far fewer troops to defend it than McClellan or anybody
else had hitherto thought necessary.

On July 24, the day after his arrival at Washington, Halleck was sent
to consult with McClellan and his generals. The record of their
consultations sufficiently shows the intricacy of the problem to be
decided. The question of the health of the climate in August weighed
much with Halleck, but the most striking feature of their conversation
was the fluctuation of McClellan's own opinion upon each important
point--at one moment he even gave Halleck the impression that he wished
under all the circumstances to withdraw and to join Pope. When Halleck
returned to Washington McClellan telegraphed in passionate anxiety to
be left in the Peninsula and reinforced. On the other hand, some of
the officers of highest rank with him wrote strongly urging withdrawal.
This latter was the course on which Lincoln and Halleck decided. In
the circumstances it was certainly the simplest course to concentrate
all available forces in an attack upon the enemy from the direction of
Washington which would keep that capital covered all the while. It was
in any case no hasty and no indefensible decision, nor is there any
justification for the frequent assertion that some malignant influence
brought it about. It is one of the steps taken by Lincoln which have
been the most often lamented. But if McClellan had had all he demanded
to take Richmond and had made good his promise, what would Lee have
done? Lee's own answer to a similar question later was, "We would swap
queens"; that is, he would have taken Washington. If so the
Confederacy would not have fallen, but in all probability the North
would have collapsed, and European Powers would at the least have
recognised the