ident's. This must not be taken in the sense that Lincoln's
personal guidance was present in every department. He had his own
department, concerned with the maintenance of Northern unity and with
that great underlying problem of internal policy which will before long
appear again, and the business of the War Department was so immediately
vital as to require his ceaseless attention; but in other matters the
degree and manner of his control of course varied. Again, it is far
from being the case that the Cabinet had little influence on his
action. He not only consulted it much, but deferred to it much. His
wisdom seems to have shown itself in nothing more strongly than in
recognising when he wanted advice and when he did not, when he needed
support and when he could stand alone. Sometimes he yielded to his
Ministers because he valued their judgment, sometimes also because he
gauged by them the public support without which his action must fail.
Sometimes, when he was sure of the necessity, he took grave steps
without advice from them or any one. More often he tried to arrive
with them at a real community of decision. It is often impossible to
guess what acts of an Administration are rightly credited to its chief.
The hidden merit or demerit of many statesmen has constantly lain in
the power, or the lack of it, of guiding their colleagues and being
guided in turn. If we tried to be exact in saying Lincoln, or
Lincoln's Cabinet, or the North did this or that, it would be necessary
to thresh out many bushels of tittle-tattle. The broad impression,
however, remains that in the many things in which Lincoln did not
directly rule he ruled through a group of capable men of whom he made
the best use, and whom no other chief could have induced to serve so
long in concord. As we proceed some authentic examples of his precise
relations with them will appear, in which, unimportant as they seem,
one test of his quality as a statesman and of his character should be
sought.

The naval operations of the war afford many tales of daring on both
sides which cannot here be noticed. They afford incidents of strange
interest now, such as the exploit of the first submarine. (It belonged
to the South; its submersion invariably resulted in the death of the
whole crew; and, with full knowledge of this, a devoted crew went down
and destroyed a valuable Northern iron-clad.) The ravages on commerce
of the _Alabama_ and some other Southern