rth Germany, would have become
isolated, if we had been obliged to count with the fact that nobody
would be willing to pardon our new successes--the great successes
which we had won. No great power looks with favor on the successes of
its neighbors.

Our relations with Russia, however, were not disturbed by the
experience of 1866. In that year the memory of Count Buol's policy and
of the policy of Austria during the Crimean War was too fresh in
Russia to permit the rise of the thought that Russia could assist the
Austrian monarchy against the Prussian attack, or could renew the
campaign, which Emperor Nicholas had fought for Austria in 1849--ask
your pardon, if I sit down for a moment. I cannot stand so long.

Our most natural support, therefore, still remained with Russia, due
very properly to the policy of Emperor Alexander I. in this
century--not to speak of the last century at all. In 1813 he might
well have turned back at the Polish frontier, and have made peace, and
later he might have dropped Prussia. We certainly owed our
reestablishment on the old basis at that time to the benevolence of
Emperor Alexander I.--or, if you wish to be sceptical, you may say to
the Russian policy, which was such as Prussia needed. Gratitude for
this dominated the reign of Frederick William III. The credit,
however, which Russia had in the Prussian accounts was used up by the
friendship, I may even say servility, of Prussia during the entire
reign of Emperor Nicholas, and was, I own, wiped out at Olmuetz. There
Emperor Nicholas did not take the part of Prussia, nor did he keep us
from evil experiences or certain humiliations, for Emperor Nicholas
really preferred Austria to Prussia. The idea that we owed
Russia any thanks during his reign is a historical myth.

We did, nevertheless, not break our traditional relations with Russia
while he lived; and in the Crimean War we remained true, as I said
before, to our Russian duty, in spite of many threats and great
dangers. His Majesty, the late King, had no desire to play a decisive
part in the war by a great levy of troops, as I believe we could have
done. We had made certain treaties requiring us to put in the field
100,000 men after the lapse of a stated time; and I proposed to His
Majesty to levy not 100,000 but 200,000 men, and mounted at that, whom
we could use as well toward the right as toward the left, in which
case, I said, Your Majesty will be the arbiter of the Crimean War.