this weak army of seventy thousand men.
The impoverished condition of the country shows only too clearly in
the lessened income of the State. In vain a number of indirect taxes
have been introduced. A kind of tax on meat and meal is levied in a
very primitive way on the street corners of the capital. The fishermen
pay 20 per cent, of the catch in their nets. Weights and measures must
be stamped anew every year; and all products of industry, from
silverware and shawls to shoes and shirts, are stamped with the
imperial seal. But the proceeds from these taxes are enriching only
those who collect them. The riches melt before the avaricious eye of
the administration, and the ruler of the most beautiful lands in three
continents is drawing water with the leaky pots of the daughters of
Danaus.
For the payment of its necessities the government must rely on the
confiscation of property, as it passes to new heirs or outright, on
the sale of offices, and finally on presents and the miserable means
of adulterating the currency.
In regard to the confiscation of money inherited by State officials,
the present Sultan has declared that he will do without it. This
edict, however, instead of abolishing the practice, acknowledges the
correctness of the principle. Formerly the edicts of confiscation were
accompanied by the death warrants of those who were to be robbed.
Today there are gentler means in use for relieving people of the
surplus of their wealth.
The sale of offices continues to be the chief source of income of the
State. The candidates borrow the money at a high rate of interest from
some Armenian business house, while the government permits these
"lease-holders" to recoup themselves by the exploitation of their
provinces to whatever extent they wish. Withal, they must fear either
a higher bidder, who leaves them no time to get rich, or the State, if
they happen to have grown rich. The provinces know beforehand that the
new pasha has come to rob them. They, therefore, prepare themselves.
Interviews are held, and if no agreement is reached, war is waged, or
if an agreement is broken a revolution takes place. As soon as the
pasha has settled with the _Agas_, he stands in fear of the Porte. He,
therefore, combines with other pashas for mutual protection, and the
Sultan must negotiate with the future neighbors of a new pasha before
he can appoint him. In a very few _pashaliks_, to be sure, the
beginning of a better order o
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