ve made the
Name stand for.

But since, as has been remarked, we have need of GENERAL words, though
we know not the real essences of things; all we can do is, to collect
such a number of simple ideas as, by examination, we find to be united
together in things existing, and thereof to make one complex idea.
Which, though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists,
is yet the specific essence to which our name belongs, and is
convertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of these
nominal essences. For example: there be that say that the essence of
body is EXTENSION; if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the
essence of anything for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put
extension for body, and when we would say that body moves, let us say
that extension moves, and see how ill it will look. He that should say
that one extension by impulse moves another extension, would, by the
bare expression, sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion. The
essence of anything in respect of us, is the whole complex idea
comprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides the
several distinct simple ideas that make them up, the confused one of
substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always
a part: and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension, but an
extended solid thing; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, or
impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, BODY moves
or impels. Likewise, to say that a rational animal is capable of
conversation, is all one as to say a man; but no one will say that
rationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole
essence to which we give the name man.

22. Our Abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of the Species we make in
instance in that of Man.

There are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are
hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that
have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language
too. There are creatures, as it is said, (sit fides penes authorem, but
there appears no contradiction that there should be such,) that, with
language and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have
hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where
the females have. If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all
of human species? it is plain, the question refers only to the nomina