d bulk, with the
marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other names
would be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more,
nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus I think it is in natural
things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say)
within, are different in a RATIONAL MAN and a CHANGELING; no more
than that there is a difference in the frame between a DRILL and a
CHANGELING. But whether one or both these differences be essential or
specifical, is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement
with the complex idea that the name man stands for: for by that alone
can it be determined whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man.

40. Species of Artificial Things less confused than Natural.

From what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the
species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and
uncertainty than in natural. Because an artificial thing being a
production of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well
knows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other
idea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to be
known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or essence of
the several sorts of artificial things, consisting for the most part
in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts, and sometimes
motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such
as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to
attain a certain idea thereof; and so settle the signification of the
names whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished, with
less doubt, obscurity, and equivocation than we can in things natural,
whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the
reach of our discoveries.

41. Artificial Things of distinct Species.

I must be excused here if I think artificial things are of distinct
species as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly
ranked into sorts, by different abstract ideas, with general names
annexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of natural
substances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinct
species one from another, as a horse and a dog; they being expressed in
our minds by distinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations?

42. Substances alone, of all our several sorts of ideas, have proper
Names.

Thi