f the remains of other schools of philosophy as well as
of the Peripatetics. But, without entering on this wide field, even a
superficial consideration of the logical and metaphysical works which
pass under the name of Aristotle, whether we suppose them to have
come directly from his hand or to be the tradition of his school, is
sufficient to show how great was the mental activity which prevailed in
the latter half of the fourth century B.C.; what eddies and
whirlpools of controversies were surging in the chaos of thought, what
transformations of the old philosophies were taking place everywhere,
what eclecticisms and syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms were
affecting the mind of Hellas. The decline of philosophy during this
period is no less remarkable than the loss of freedom; and the two
are not unconnected with each other. But of the multitudinous sea of
opinions which were current in the age of Aristotle we have no exact
account. We know of them from allusions only. And we cannot with
advantage fill up the void of our knowledge by conjecture: we can only
make allowance for our ignorance.

There are several passages in the Philebus which are very characteristic
of Plato, and which we shall do well to consider not only in their
connexion, but apart from their connexion as inspired sayings or
oracles which receive their full interpretation only from the history
of philosophy in later ages. The more serious attacks on traditional
beliefs which are often veiled under an unusual simplicity or irony are
of this kind. Such, for example, is the excessive and more than human
awe which Socrates expresses about the names of the gods, which may
be not unaptly compared with the importance attached by mankind to
theological terms in other ages; for this also may be comprehended under
the satire of Socrates. Let us observe the religious and intellectual
enthusiasm which shines forth in the following, 'The power and faculty
of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of the truth':
or, again, the singular acknowledgment which may be regarded as the
anticipation of a new logic, that 'In going to war for mind I must have
weapons of a different make from those which I used before, although
some of the old ones may do again.' Let us pause awhile to reflect on
a sentence which is full of meaning to reformers of religion or to the
original thinker of all ages: 'Shall we then agree with them of
old time, and merely reas