'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly
given to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins
by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are
two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and
was not this what we were saying, Protarchus?

PROTARCHUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was
conceded between us?

PROTARCHUS: What was it?

SOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things.

PROTARCHUS: In what respect?

SOCRATES: In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and
in all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of
anything else.

PROTARCHUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of
wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure
was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part
whatever in pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: We did.

SOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be
sufficient?

PROTARCHUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take
up the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom
and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him
consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire,--I will not say
pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception
that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any
recollection, however momentary, of the feeling,--but would he desire to
have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about
wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that any one would
choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than
with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom,
rather than with a certain degree of wisdom?

PROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any
more?

SOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good
cannot possibly be either of them?

PROTARCHUS: Impossible.

SOCRATES: Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less
accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be
duly assigned.

PROTARCHUS: Right.

SOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?

PROTARCHUS: What road?

SOCRATES: Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover
in