vious argument showed
that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity,
likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the
smallest use in any enquiry.

PROTARCHUS: That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would
the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him
is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will
tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing
with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best
of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and
enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered--No, not those,
but another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves
of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to
examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are
to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of
pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the
like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully
threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question
was settled; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And
now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back;
cease then to fight against us in this way.

SOCRATES: In what way?

PHILEBUS: Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we
have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a
general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if
we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider,
then, whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their
kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to
find some other mode of clearing up our controversy.

SOCRATES: If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words
'if you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to
have recalled something to my mind.

PHILEBUS: What is that?

SOCRATES: I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about
pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they
were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the
good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better
than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the
victory, for the good will