contingent; but I will first explain the
words necessary and impossible.
A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence
or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing
necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is
said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
to the imperfection of our knowledge.
A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or
does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it
does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt
concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes
us,--such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
Note II.--It clearly follows from what we have said, that
things have been brought into being by God in the highest
perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in
God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its
contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute
to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They
assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also
convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is
no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
could not have been by him cr
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