formly to traditional methods.
They refrained from declaring Korea a dependency of China, yet they
sought to keep up "the romance of ultimate dependency and
intermediate sovereignty." It was thus that, in 1876, Korea was
allowed to conclude with Japan a treaty describing the former as "an
independent State enjoying the same rights as Japan," nor did the
Peking Government make any protest when the United States, Great
Britain, and other powers concluded similar treaties.
To exercise independence in practice, however, was not permitted to
Korea. A Chinese resident was stationed in Seoul, the Korean capital,
and he quickly became an imperium in imperio. Thenceforth Japan, in
all her dealings with the Peninsular Kingdom, found the latter
behaving as a Chinese dependency, obeying the Chinese resident in
everything. Again and again, Japanese patience was tried by these
anomalous conditions, and although nothing occurred of sufficient
magnitude to warrant official protest, the Tokyo Government became
sensible of perpetual rebuffs and humiliating interferences at
China's hands. Korea herself suffered seriously from this state of
national irresponsibility. There was no security of life and
property, or any effective desire to develop the country's resources.
If the victims of oppression appealed to force, China readily lent
military assistance to suppress them, and thus the royal family of
Korea learned to regard its tenure of power as dependent on ability
to conciliate China.
On Japan's side, also, the Korean question caused much anxiety. It
was impossible for the Tokyo statesmen to ignore the fact that their
country's safety depended largely on preserving Korea from the grasp
of a Western power. They saw plainly that such a result might at any
moment be expected if Korea was suffered to drift into a state of
administrative incompetence. Once, in 1882, and again, in 1884, when
Chinese soldiers were employed to suppress reform movements which
would have impaired the interests of the Korean monarch, the latter's
people, counting Japan to be the source of progressive tendencies in
the East, destroyed her legation in Seoul, driving its inmates out of
the city. Japan was not yet prepared to assert herself forcibly in
redress of such outrages, but in the ensuing negotiations she
acquired titles that "touched the core of China's alleged
Suzerainty." Thus, in 1882, Japan obtained recognition of her right
to protect her legation wi
|