policy, but not unnaturally declined to abate any of the
advantages previously enjoyed by her in Manchuria. Those advantages
were very substantial. They included a twenty-five-year lease--with
provision for renewal--of the Liaotung peninsula, within which area
of 1220 square miles Chinese troops might not penetrate, whereas
Russia would not only exercise full administrative authority, but
also take military and naval action of any kind; they included
the creation of a neutral territory on the immediate north of the
former and still more extensive, which remained under Chinese
administration, and where neither Chinese nor Russian troops might
enter, nor might China, without Russia's consent, cede land, open
trading marts, or grant concessions to any third nationality; and
they included the right to build some sixteen hundred miles of
railway (which China would have the opportunity of purchasing at cost
price in the year 1938, and would be entitled to receive gratis in
1982), as well as the right to hold extensive zones on either side of
the railway, to administer these zones in the fullest sense, and to
work all mines lying along the lines.

Under the Portsmouth treaty these advantages were transferred to
Japan by Russia, the railway, however, being divided so that only the
portion (521.5 miles) to the south of Kwanchengtsz fell to Japan's
share, while the portion (1077 miles) to the north of that place
remained in Russia's hands. China's consent to the above transfers
and assignments was obtained in a treaty signed at Peking on the 22nd
of December, 1905. Thus, Japan came to hold in Manchuria a position
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, she figured as the champion
of the Chinese empire's integrity and as an exponent of the new
principle of equal opportunity and the open door. On the other, she
appeared as the legatee of many privileges more or less inconsistent
with that principle. But, at the same time, nearly all the great
powers of Europe were similarly circumstanced. In their cases, also,
the same incongruity was observed between the newly professed policy
and the aftermath of the old practice. It was scarcely to be expected
that Japan alone should make a large sacrifice on the altar of a
theory to which no other State thought of yielding any retrospective
obedience whatever. She did, indeed, furnish a clear proof of
deference to the open-door doctrine, for instead of reserving the
railway zones to her own e