rn to Japan, inasmuch as the separate
existence of the former was essential to the safety of the latter,
and charged that "Russia, in disrespect of her solemn treaty pledges
to China and of her repeated assurances to other powers, was still in
occupation of Manchuria, had consolidated and strengthened her hold
upon those provinces, and was bent upon their final annexation." With
regard to Russia's accusation against Japan of drawing the sword
without due notice, a distinguished British publicist made the
following comment in the columns of The Times (London):

"Far from thinking the Japanese attack on the night of February 8th,
two full days after the announcement of the intention to take action,
was an exception to, or a deviation from, tradition and precedent, we
should rather count ourselves fortunate if our enemy, in the next
naval war we have to wage, does not strike two days before blazoning
forth his intention, instead of two days after. The tremendous and
decisive results of success for the national cause are enough to
break down all the restraining influences of the code of
international law and Christian morality."

THE FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS

From the moment when war became inevitable, the problem of absorbing
interest was to determine Russia's strategy, and it was ultimately
seen that the two main groups of her forces were to be posted at Port
Arthur and on the Yalu; the latter to resist an advance from Korea,
and the former to defend the Liaotung peninsula, which constituted
the key of the Russian position. Between the mouth of the Yalu and
the Liaotung peninsula, a distance of 120 miles, there were many
points where raiding parties might have been landed to cut the
Russian railway. Against this danger, flying squadrons of Cossacks
were employed. After the destruction of the three Russian vessels in
Chemulpo and the crippling of the Port Arthur squadron, Japanese
transports entered the former port and quietly landed some three
thousand troops, which advanced immediately upon Seoul and took
possession of it.

From that time there could be no doubt that the intention of the
Japanese was to make their first attack upon the enemy by marching up
the Korean peninsula, and that the capital of Korea was chosen for a
base of operations because of climatic considerations. Chemulpo,
however, was not the only landing-place. Fusan also served for that
purpose, as subsequently did also Chinnampo, an inlet on the