reform and grew cold to the cause of the abolition of the slave trade.
But the war brought worse than an arrest of progress; it brought
repression of freedom and a tremendous load of debt. The French
propaganda roused general indignation and alarm. Towards the end of 1792
the ministers were convinced of the existence of a plot for effecting a
revolution by the aid of France. There was much to justify their alarm;
Ireland seemed ripe for revolt, political discontent was strong in
Scotland, and evidence, gained later, confirmed them in their belief
that sedition was reaching a dangerous height in England. They overrated
the existing danger, though if sedition had remained unchecked it might
soon have become dangerous; for France was attacking the state by secret
seduction as well as by open arms. Extraordinary precautions were taken
to meet a peril which was specially terrible because its extent was
unknown. Measures of repression were eagerly welcomed by parliament;
judges and magistrates exercised their powers with harshness, and juries
were often biassed by the feeling of the bench. The nation was alarmed,
and severity was popular.

[Sidenote: _PITT AS A WAR MINISTER._]

Pitt, who had guided England in peace, was to remain at the helm in
war. The conduct of the war is therefore closely connected with the
question whether, great as he was in peace, he was a great war
minister.[241] The British army, which in 1792 only numbered about
17,300 men and at the outbreak of the war was increased by 9,945, was so
small that it could only either act a secondary part in a continental
war, or engage in isolated expeditions to support insurrections in
France. During the first part of the war our successes on land were
trifling and our failures many. This was partly at least due to the
custom of regarding noble birth rather than military attainments as a
claim to command. Though Pitt, as we shall see, insisted on the recall
of the Duke of York, he did not break through this evil custom, and our
generals, though brave, were often incompetent. Pitt built great hopes
on the co-operation of the French royalists and many expeditions were
sent out to act with them. A belligerent power should place little
dependence on insurrectionary movements in an enemy's country; for
insurgents, however hostile they may be to their own government, will
seldom act cordially with a foreign invader; their forces are generally
unorganised, and they are ap