t to expect too much of their foreign ally.
It is good policy to encourage them by sending them supplies, for their
revolts embarrass their government and are useful as diversions in war.
But a belligerent should not squander on diversions strength which might
be employed in the main conflict. Pitt's expeditions of this kind were
costly failures; they inflicted no deadly wound and were expensive both
in men and money. On the other hand England was victorious by sea; the
naval force was raised to 45,000 men in February, 1793, was constantly
increased, and was commanded by admirals whose right to command was
based on their skill in seamanship and maritime warfare.

For the security of England and the peace of Europe France, it was held,
must be reduced to powerlessness. England's greatness at sea might
enable her to destroy the enemy's commerce, conquer her colonies, and
blockade her ports; the object of the war could be attained only by
victories on land. Politically the continental states were rotten; their
rulers were selfish despots, each bent on extending his dominions by
any means, however dishonest; for international morality had broken
down before the bait offered by the weakness of Poland. What barrier
could they oppose to the flood of French aggression, the outcome of the
enthusiasm of a great people? When France forced England into war she
provoked a more dangerous enemy--the will of a nation. Supported by the
national will, Pitt embarked on the task of combining the powers of
Europe against France, and as some were unwilling and some unable to
fight at their own expense, he paid them with English gold, and England
found money for them as well as for her own naval and military
operations. Pitt raised enormous loans. The funded debt, which in 1792
was, roughly, L238,000,000, rose during nine years of war to about
L574,000,000. He began to borrow at once; in 1793 he raised a loan of
L4,500,000, and in 1794 another of L11,000,000, besides imposing new
taxes amounting to L913,000.

He has been blamed for not raising more by taxation during the early
years of the war instead of burdening posterity so heavily. The
financial difficulties of France led him to believe that the war would
be short. "It will be a short war," he said, "and certainly ended in one
or two campaigns." "No, sir," replied the more prescient Burke, "it will
be a long war and a dangerous war; but it must be undertaken." In its
earliest years Pitt