rally into
Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps you
will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The
truth is, the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak
vengeance on South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that
she deserves all that seems in store for her.... I look upon Columbia as
quite as bad as Charleston."

The evidence from many points of view corroborating this statement of
the feeling of the army towards South Carolina is ample. The rank and
file of Sherman's army were men of some education and intelligence; they
were accustomed to discuss public matters, weigh reasons, and draw
conclusions. They thought that South Carolina had brought on the Civil
War, was responsible for the cost and bloodshed of it, and no punishment
for her could be too severe. That was likewise the sentiment of the
officers. A characteristic expression of the feeling may be found in a
home letter of Colonel Charles F. Morse, of the second Massachusetts,
who speaks of the "miserable, rebellious State of South Carolina." "Pity
for these inhabitants," he further writes, "I have none. In the first
place, they are rebels, and I am almost prepared to agree with Sherman
that a rebel has no rights, not even the right to live except by our
permission."

It is no wonder, then, that Southern writers, smarting at the loss
caused by Sherman's campaign of invasion, should believe that Sherman
connived at the destruction of Columbia. But they are wrong in that
belief. The general's actions were not so bad as his words. Before his
troops made their entrance he issued this order: "General Howard will
... occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings, railroad property,
manufacturing and machine shops, but will spare libraries and asylums
and private dwellings." That Sherman was entirely sincere when he gave
this order, and that his general officers endeavored to carry it out
cannot be questioned. A statement which he made under oath in 1872
indicates that he did not connive at the destruction of Columbia. "If I
had made up my mind to burn Columbia," he declared, "I would have burnt
it with no more feeling than I would a common prairie dog village; but I
did not do it."

Other words of his exhibit without disguise his feelings in regard to
the occurrence which the South has regarded as a piece of wanton
mischief. "The ulterior and strategic advantages of the occupatio