it with others, and that he had already
begun the necessary preparations, is obvious both from the record and
from all that occurred during the day. The council did no more than to
coincide in his views and confirm his judgment.[164]

[Footnote 164: ORIGIN OF THE RETREAT.--Precisely when and why
Washington came to a determination in his own mind to retreat has been
made the subject of a somewhat nice historical inquiry. Gordon gives
one story; Mr. William B. Reed, biographer of Colonel Reed, gives
another; and Mr. Bancroft, General Carrington, and others indulge in
more or less extended criticisms on the point. Gordon's account is the
most probable and the best supported.

Whatever Washington may have thought of the situation on Long Island
after the defeat, it is enough to know that he immediately reinforced
himself there, and that on the 27th and 28th he made no preparations
to withdraw to New York. It far from follows, however, that he had
concluded to stay and fight it out "on that line" at all hazards. He
was acting on the defensive, and was necessarily obliged to guide
himself largely by the movements of the enemy. On Long Island,
therefore, he could only be on the watch, and, like a prudent general,
decide according to circumstances. Up to the morning of the 29th he
was still watching--watching not only the enemy, but his own army
also. In his letter to Congress, written at "half after 4 o'clock
A.M." of this date, he gives no intimation of a retreat, but rather
leaves that body to infer that he proposed to remain where he was. He
speaks, for instance, of expecting tents during the day to make the
troops more comfortable. On the same morning Reed wrote: "We hope to
be able to make a good stand, as our lines are pretty strong;" and he
doubtless reflected the views of his Chief at the time.

The two particular dangers now to which the army was exposed were the
danger of having its communication with New York cut off by the ships,
and the danger of being approached by the enemy in front by siege
operations, which the army was not prepared to meet. The first danger
had existed ever since the arrival of the enemy, and had been provided
for. All the batteries on Governor's Island and on both sides of the
East River had been built to guard against it. In addition, ships had
been sunk in the channel. Washington accordingly must have thoroughly
canvassed the risks he ran in regard to his communications. _These
alone ha