d not decided him to retreat._ On the morning of the 29th,
however, he first became aware of the second danger. It was not until
then that the enemy fully developed their intention of advancing by
trenches. After working all night, as Howe reports, they had thrown up
by morning, as Little reports, a parallel sixty rods long and one
hundred and fifty rods distant from Fort Putnam. Reed wrote, "They are
intrenching at a small distance." In twenty-four hours at the farthest
they would have come within very close range, and the hazardous
alternative would have been forced upon us to attempt to drive them
out of their own works. Washington well knew that, in view of the
condition of his men and the great disparity of numbers, this could
not be done. When, therefore, he became assured of Howe's intentions
he acted promptly--_he determined to retreat_; and this determination
he reached early on the morning of the 29th.

This is substantially the theory which Gordon presents as a fact, and
it is most consistent with fact. Gordon's account is this: "The
victorious army encamped in the front of the American works in the
evening; and on the 28th at night broke ground in form about 4 or 500
yards distant from a redoubt which covered the left of the Americans.
The same day Gen. Mifflin crossed over from New York with 1000 men; at
night he made an offer to Gen. Washington of going the rounds, which
was accepted. He observed the approaches of the enemy, and the
forwardness of their batteries; and was convinced that no time was to
be lost. The next morning he conversed with the General upon the
subject, and said, 'You must either fight or retreat immediately. What
is your strength?' The General answered, 'Nine thousand.' The other
replied, 'It is not sufficient, we must therefore retreat.' They were
both agreed as to the calling of a Council of war; and Gen. Mifflin
was to propose a retreat. But as he was to make that proposal, lest
his own character should suffer, he stipulated, that if a retreat
should be agreed upon, he would command the rear; and if an action the
van."

The fact that Mifflin was given the command of the rear on the
retreat, and the fact that he sent the order to Heath that morning to
send down all the boats from King's Bridge, lend the highest
probability to Gordon's version of the story. Parsons, who was one of
the members of the council, mentions this particularly as one of the
reasons for withdrawing, namely,