ed for
several hours.

Meanwhile the remainder of the army, with the exception of a small
flanking force to the left of the Highland Brigade, took position on
its right, prolonging the front in that direction to the Modder; some
companies being thrown to the rear along the course of the river,
guarding the fords against any attack of the enemy upon the right
flank--demonstrations of which were made but repelled. The British
artillery was brought actively and continuously into play, with
perceptible effect upon the enemy's fire. The battle then resolved
itself into {p.167} both parties holding their positions until
nightfall, when the Highland Brigade was withdrawn from the perilous
position in which it had passed fifteen hours of exposure, heat and
thirst. The British slept on the ground, their general purposing next
morning to occupy the kopje, if deserted, but finding the enemy then
still in the trenches, he withdrew his force to the Modder.

The battle of Magersfontein brought Methuen to a standstill, and
postponed for more than two months the relief of Kimberley. The
disaster which befell the Highland Brigade was one of those incidents
which ought not to have occurred, but determination of blame must
await more precise information than is now accessible. To retain the
cover of darkness for an approach made within effective, though long,
range of the enemy's fire--to deploy as near as possible to him, but
still too distant to be seen--to keep 3,000 men in black darkness in
touch, yet not compacted--these are conditions desirable of attainment
but difficult to combine, and, like all combinations, liable to fail
in some element. The total loss, by the last revised returns, was
{p.168} 171 killed, 691 wounded, four-fifths of which fell on the
Highland Brigade and in the first few moments. Among the slain was
General Wauchope.

From the day of this battle until February 11, the opposing forces
continued in the positions occupied by them before the engagement,
Methuen upon the north bank of the Modder, Cronje holding the ranges
at Magersfontein and Spytfontein. The great comparative mobility of
the Boers, with their more numerous and seasoned horses, enabled them
to maintain the investment of Kimberley, and yet retain the power to
concentrate betimes at any threatened point from this interior
position. Here between the two bodies of the enemy, between Methuen
and Kekewich, was the bulk of their army. Kimberley was nev