on the
east of the railroad, in general support of Hildyard. On this part of
the field the ground was flat, but intersected by several dongas. Each
extreme of the line of infantry formed by the four brigades was
covered as usual by a flanking force, chiefly of horse; but while that
on the British left had this function only, that on the right, the
mounted brigade, with one battery--six guns--was {p.226} to attempt
Hlangwane Hill. If successful, it was to enfilade the Wylie kopjes
from that position. The remaining four batteries of field artillery
were intended at the proper moment to concentrate their fire upon the
Wylie kopjes, preparing the way for the crucial charge of the 2nd
Brigade. For this object, two followed Lyttelton's 4th Brigade, and
two the 6th; the last, under Colonel Long, being accompanied by six
naval 12-pounders.
From these dispositions it appears, as is clearly stated by Buller in
his report, that all the differing factors in the attack were to
converge for their object, and according to their respective
qualities, upon "the kopjes north of the iron bridge"--to use Clery's
expression in the orders for battle. The 2nd Brigade marched upon them
direct; the 5th approached their right flank by way of the Bridle
Drift; the 4th and 6th reinforced, as required, each of the others;
the four batteries--two on either side--brought a cross-fire upon the
same objects; while the flanking force on the British right was to
assist by an enfilading fire from Hlangwane. To combine {p.227}
several separate efforts, so that by mutual support and effect each at
the critical moments contributes its due share to the one main
exertion, is always difficult. Failure may ensue from lack of the
nicest attention on the part of any one subordinate, or from those
chances which must always be allowed for in war. The British at
Colenso suffered from both causes.
Hart, on the left, having the longest road to reach the kopjes, moved
first. The brigade reached the river, but missed the ford. It has been
said that the enemy, by building a dam below, had raised the water to
seven feet. Be that as it may, a few venturing in with musket and
ammunition belts were drowned. Groping for the way, and apparently
confused between the tortuous courses of the river itself and a
tributary which enters near by, the mass of the troops blundered into
a sharp bend curving to the northward, thus coming under a cross fire
from the two enclosing banks
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