d at Buller's "suggestion"--or, to use Warren's words,
"the Commander-in-Chief desired."
The assault was made that night and was entirely successful, the
British gaining possession of the summit and remaining there all next
day. It was found, however, that the Boers had guns in position on
neighbouring heights within effective range. It was possible also for
the Boer riflemen, with their extraordinary aptitudes for stalking, to
maintain a perpetual fire from well-covered positions; whereas, to
whatever cause attributable, there does not seem to have been a
well-organised plan to provide artificially and rapidly the shelter
which the flat bare tops of South African mountains do not naturally
extend. General Woodgate was mortally wounded at 10 A.M.
Reinforcements were then on the way, and when his fall was reported,
{p.259} General Coke, with two fresh regiments, was sent to assume
command. He heliographed down at 2 P.M. that unless the enemy's guns
could be silenced the men could not hold the place under another day's
shelling. Some hours later, at 9.30 P.M., he was called down to make a
personal report of the conditions.
Towards nightfall Warren made arrangements to send up two naval
12-pounders, a mountain battery, and a heavy working party under
engineer direction to organise field protection--a provision that
should have formed part of the original plan--elaborated through four
days of operations. Before these reached the summit, and in ignorance
that they were on the way, Colonel Thorneycroft, left in command by
Coke's departure, decided that the position was untenable, and soon
after 9.30 P.M. evacuated it. Upon this Sir Redvers Buller commented:
"Preparations for the second day's defence should have been organised
during the day, and have been commenced at nightfall. As this was not
done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion." From
this judgment Lord Roberts {p.260} dissented vigorously. "I am of
opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's assumption of
responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night
the enemy's fire could not have been formidable, and ... it would not
have taken more than two or three hours at most to communicate by
messenger with General Coke or Sir C. Warren, and to receive a reply.
General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at 9.30 P.M. for the
purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the
idea of a withdrawal had not been e
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