r mobility of his
cavalry, who headed him off to the eastward, giving time for the
British infantry to come up. The trains went with Cronje, and
apparently it was his unwillingness to drop them, rather than the
direction of his retreat, that lost him. Because men not so encumbered
escaped north, it cannot be certainly concluded that he could by the
same course have saved his trains.

[Footnote 36: See summary of a letter of Michael
Davitt, whose Boer sympathies are well known, from
Kroonstadt, March 31, to the Dublin _Freeman's
Journal_, given in the London _Times_, June 25,
1900.]

Be it as it may, Friday morning the 16th found the Boer lines at
Magersfontein empty. The presence of British divisions south of the
Modder compelled Cronje to take a course {p.277} north of it. Except
for the drifts, the river thus protected his flank; and if he could,
by diverging sufficiently, slip undetected past Klip Drift, leaving
the easternmost of the British divisions--Kelly-Kenny--in his rear, he
might reach the point he aimed at, Koodoosrand Drift, twenty-four
miles north-east of Klip Drift, cross there, and so reach the direct
road from Jacobsdal to Bloemfontein. This effected, the British would
have a stern chase, proverbially long, and in this instance certainly
fruitless.

Cronje nearly succeeded. Early on Friday morning the British at Klip
Drift saw north of them a great cloud of dust, moving eastward. It was
the Boer convoy, in rear of which doubtless was their army. Kitchener
sent out mounted infantry to get to the north of the retreating force,
while a brigade of foot was directed to keep along the river's bank.
Word was sent at once to French in Kimberley, who was employing that
day in clearing the country north of the town. The field telegraph
being cut by the enemy, he received Kitchener's message late at night.
This, after stating Cronje's movements, added that {p.278} if he,
"with all available horses and guns, could head him, and prevent him
from crossing the river, the infantry from Klip Drift would press on
and annihilate or take the whole force prisoners."[37]

[Footnote 37: "The Cavalry Rush to Kimberley," p.
210.]

French left at 3.30 A.M. with one brigade and three batteries, the
others to follow as they could with their worn-out animals. The enemy
had a long start, but fro