e all my available
forces, including the Cape Police, at the point of greatest importance
in my command--Kimberley."

The {p.140} inference of Colonel Kekewich as to the Boers' strategy
was as accurate as his general action was militarily judicious. The
concentration and development of his resources not merely deterred the
enemy from assault, but detained them there in force, to the neglect
of matters elsewhere much more urgently worthy of their efforts. The
gain of Kimberley, had they gained it, would have been poor
compensation for the daily increasing solidity of the still weak
British grasp on the central positions outlined by De Aar, Orange
River and Naauwport. This absorption of the Boers' attention by
Kimberley was maintained by frequent sorties of the garrison, in every
direction, which at an early period of the siege became possible
through the ready facility with which the citizens were converted into
irregular mounted troops. "It will be observed," wrote Kekewich, "that
portions of the mounted corps were employed on every occasion" of the
continued sallies in greater or less force, especially at the period
of Methuen's advance.

At the same time the enemy was preparing to bombard, and was busily
engaged in {p.141} taking possession, by small bodies of from 100 to
250 men, of the undefended towns and villages in Griqualand West--the
thinly peopled district to the west of Kimberley. This pleasant but
useless pastime occupied them agreeably, and diverted them from
molesting the British at Orange River and De Aar.

"My general plan for the defence of Kimberley," says Kekewich in his
report, "was based on the principle of always keeping the enemy on the
move, and constantly in fear of an attack from an unexpected quarter.
Later, when the advance of the relief column from the Orange River
commenced, and I was put in possession of information concerning the
probable date of its arrival in Kimberley, I adopted such measures as
I hoped would cause the retention of a large force of the enemy in my
immediate neighbourhood, and thus enable the relief column to deal
with the Boer force in detail. It was with these objects that the
numerous sorties and demonstrations in force were made by portions of
the garrison of Kimberley."

Such {p.142} continual offensive action is of the essence of dexterous
defence, especially when designed in support of movements elsewhere
occurring. It is not surprising, therefore, that Lord