reaty
whereby France should receive Louisiana in return for the cession of
Tuscany to the heir of the Duke of Parma. This young man had married
the daughter of Charles IV. of Spain; and, for the aggrandizement of
his son-in-law, that _roi faineant_, was ready, nay eager, to bargain
away a quarter of a continent; and he did so by a secret convention
signed at St. Ildefonso on October 7th, 1800.
But though Charles rejoiced over this exchange, Godoy, who was gifted
with some insight into the future, was determined to frustrate it.
Various events occurred which enabled this wily Minister, first to
delay, and then almost to prevent, the odious surrender. Chief among
these was the certainty that the transfer from weak hands to strong
hands would be passionately resented by the United States; and until
peace with England was fully assured, and the power of Toussaint
broken, it would be folly for the First Consul to risk a conflict with
the United States. That they would fight rather than see the western
prairies pass into the First Consul's hands was abundantly manifest.
It is proved by many patriotic pamphlets. The most important of
these--"An Address to the Government of the United States on the
Cession of Louisiana to the French," published at Philadelphia in
1802--quoted largely from a French _brochure_ by a French Councillor
of State. The French writer had stated that along the Mississippi his
countrymen would find boundless fertile prairies, and as for the
opposition of the United States--"a nation of pedlars and
shopkeepers"--that could be crushed by a French alliance with the
Indian tribes. The American writer thereupon passionately called on
his fellow-citizens to prevent this transfer: "France is to be dreaded
only, or chiefly, on the Mississippi. The Government must take
Louisiana before it passes into her hands. The iron is now hot:
command us to rise as one man and strike." These and other like
protests at last stirred the placid Government at Washington; and it
bade the American Minister at Paris to make urgent remonstrances, the
sole effect of which was to draw from Talleyrand the bland assurance
that the transfer had not been seriously contemplated.[199]
By the month of June, 1802, all circumstances seemed to smile on
Napoleon's enterprise: England had ratified the Peace of Amiens,
Toussaint had delivered himself up to Leclerc: France had her troops
strongly posted in Tuscany and Parma, and could, if necess
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