ovided that
the French troops would evacuate her fortresses and exact no succour
either in ships, men, or money.[264] But such forbearance was scarcely
to be expected from Napoleon, who not only had a French division in
that land, supported at its expense, but also relied on its maritime
resources.[265] The proposal was at once set aside at Paris.
Napoleon's decision to drag the Batavian Republic into the war arose,
however, from no spasm of the war fever; it was calmly stated in the
secret instructions issued to General Decaen in the preceding January.
"It is now considered impossible that we could have war with England,
without dragging Holland into it." Holland was accordingly once more
ground between the upper and the nether millstone, between the Sea
Power and the Land Power, pouring out for Napoleon its resources in
men and money, and losing to the masters of the sea its ships, foreign
commerce, and colonies.
Equally hard was the treatment of Naples. In spite of the Czar's plea
that its neutrality might be respected, this kingdom was at once
occupied by St. Cyr with troops that held the chief positions on the
"heel" of Italy. This infraction of the Treaty of Florence was to be
justified by a proclamation asserting that, as England had retained
Malta, the balance of power required that France should hold these
positions as long as England held Malta.[266] This action punished the
King and Queen of Naples for their supposed subservience to English
policy; and, while lightening the burdens of the French exchequer, it
compelled England to keep a large fleet in the Mediterranean for the
protection of Egypt, and thereby weakened her defensive powers in the
Straits of Dover. To distract his foes, and compel them to extend
their lines, was ever Napoleon's aim both in military and naval
strategy; and the occupation of Taranto, together with the naval
activity at Toulon and Genoa, left it doubtful whether the great
captain determined to strike at London or to resume his eastern
adventures. His previous moves all seemed to point towards Egypt and
India; and the Admiralty instructions of May 18th, 1803, to Nelson,
reveal the expectation of our Government that the real blow would fall
on the Morea and Egypt. Six weeks later our admiral reported the
activity of French intrigues in the Morea, which was doubtless
intended to be their halfway house to Egypt--"when sooner or later,
farewell India."[267] Proofs of Napoleon's desig
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