e plans for an
Anglo-Russian alliance then being mooted at St. Petersburg, and, above
all, it served to gain time.
All these advantages were to a large extent realized. Though the Czar
had been the first to suggest our retention of Malta, he now began to
waver. The clearness and precision of Talleyrand's notes, and the
telling charge of perfidy against England, made an impression which
the cumbrous retorts of Lord Hawkesbury and the sailor-like diplomacy
of Admiral Warren failed to efface.[254] And the Russian Chancellor,
Vorontzoff, though friendly to England, and desirous of seeing her
firmly established at Malta, now began to complain of the want of
clearness in her policy. The Czar emphasized this complaint, and
suggested that, as Malta could not be the real cause of dispute, the
British Government should formulate distinctly its grievances and so set
the matter in train for a settlement. The suggestion was not complied
with. To draw up a long list of complaints, some drawn from secret
sources and exposing the First Consul's schemes, would have exasperated
his already ruffled temper; and the proposal can only be regarded as an
adroit means of justifying Alexander's sudden change of front.
Meanwhile events had proceeded apace at Paris. On April 26th Joseph
Bonaparte made a last effort to bend his brother's will, but only
gained the grudging concession that Napoleon would never consent to
the British retention of Malta for a longer time than three or four
years. As this would have enabled him to postpone the rupture long
enough to mature his oriental plans, it was rejected by Lord
Whitworth, who insisted on ten years as the minimum. The evident
determination of the British Government speedily to terminate the
affair, one way or the other, threw Napoleon into a paroxysm of
passion; and at the diplomatic reception of May 1st, from which Lord
Whitworth discreetly absented himself, he vehemently inveighed against
its conduct. Fretted by the absence of our ambassador, for whom this
sally had been intended, he returned to St. Cloud, and there dictated
this curious epistle to Talleyrand:
"I desire that your conference [with Lord Whitworth] shall not
degenerate into a conversation. Show yourself cold, reserved, and
even somewhat proud. If the [British] note contains the word
_ultimatum_ make him feel that this word implies war; if it does
not contain this word, make him insert it, remarking to h
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