ta, as some counterpoise to the acquisitions of
France, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty: but it is
not necessary to decide now whether His Majesty will be disposed to
avail himself of his pretensions in this respect."
Thus between September 10th and November 14th we passed from a
distinctly pacific to a bellicose attitude, and all but formed the
decision to demand Malta as a compensation for the recent
aggrandizements of France. To have declared war at once on these
grounds would certainly have been more dignified. But, as our Ministry
had already given way on many topics, a sudden declaration of war on
Swiss and Italian affairs would have stultified its complaisant
conduct on weightier subjects. Moreover, the whole drift of
eighteenth-century diplomacy, no less than Bonaparte's own admission,
warranted the hope of securing Malta by way of "compensation." The
adroit bargainer, who was putting up German Church lands for sale, who
had gained Louisiana by the Parma-Tuscany exchange, and still
professed to the Czar his good intentions as to an "indemnity" for the
King of Sardinia, might well be expected to admit the principle of
compensation in Anglo-French relations when these were being
jeopardized by French aggrandizement; and, as will shortly appear, the
First Consul, while professing to champion international law against
perfidious Albion, privately admitted her right to compensation, and
only demurred to its practical application when his oriental designs
were thereby compromised.
Before Whitworth proceeded to Paris, sharp remonstrances had been
exchanged between the French and British Governments. To our protests
against Napoleon's interventions in neighbouring States, he retorted
by demanding "the whole Treaty of Amiens and nothing but that treaty."
Whereupon Hawkesbury answered: "The state of the Continent at the
period of the Treaty of Amiens, and nothing but that state." In reply
Napoleon sent off a counterblast, alleging that French troops had
evacuated Taranto, that Switzerland had requested his mediation, that
German affairs possessed no novelty, and that England, having six
months previously waived her interest in continental affairs, could
not resume it at will. The retort, which has called forth the
admiration of M. Thiers, is more specious than convincing.
Hawkesbury's appeal was, not to the sword, but to law; not to French
influence gained by military occupations that cont
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