Soult's capacity was justified by the
last events of the Peninsular War. But neither his splendid rally of
the scattered French forces, nor the skilful movements of Clausel and
Suchet, nor the stubborn defence of Pamplona and San Sebastian, could
now save the French cause. The sole result of these last operations
was to restore the lustre of the French arms and to keep 150,000 men
in Spain when the scales of war were wavering in the plains of Saxony.
Napoleon's letters betray the agitation which he felt even at the
first vague rumours of the disaster of Vittoria. On the first three
days of July he penned at Dresden seven despatches on that topic in a
style so vehement that the compilers of the "Correspondance de
Napoleon" have thought it best to omit them. He further enjoined the
utmost reserve, and ordered the official journals merely to state
that, after a brisk engagement at Vittoria, the French army was
concentrating in Arragon, and that the British had captured about a
hundred guns and wagons left behind in the town for lack of horses.
There was every reason for hiding the truth. He saw how seriously it
must weaken his chances of browbeating the Eastern Powers, and of
punishing Austria for her armed mediation. Hitherto there seemed every
chance of his succeeding. The French standards flew on all the
fortresses of the Elbe and Oder. Hamburg was fast becoming a great
French camp, and Denmark was ranged on the side of France.
Indeed, on reviewing the situation on June 4th, the German publicist,
Gentz, came to the conclusion that the Emperor Francis would probably
end his vacillations by some inglorious compromise. The Kaiser desired
peace; but he also wished to shake off the irksome tutelage of his
son-in-law, and regain Illyria. For the present he wavered. Before the
news of Luetzen reached him, he undoubtedly encouraged the allies: but
that reverse brought about a half left turn towards Napoleon. "Boney's
success at Luetzen," wrote Sir G. Jackson in his Diary, "has made
Francis reconsider his half-formed resolutions." Here was the chief
difficulty for the allies. Their fortunes, and the future of Europe,
rested largely on the decision of a man whose natural irresolution of
character had been increased by adversity. Fortunately, the news from
Spain finally helped to incline him towards war; but for some weeks
his decision remained the unknown quantity in European politics.
Fortunately, too, he was amenable to t
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