hat place must be sent out on the
Burgos road, and on other fit points, the troops which are to
strengthen or to second the army of the north. Madrid, and even
Valencia, form parts of this system only as posts to be held by
your extreme left, not as places to be kept by a concentration of
forces.... To occupy Valladolid and Salamanca, to use the utmost
exertion to pacify Navarre and Arragon to keep the communication
with France rapid and safe, to be always ready to take the
offensive--these are the Emperor's instructions for the campaign,
and the principles on which all its operations ought to be
founded...."[309]

A fortnight later, Clarke bade the King threaten Ciudad Rodrigo so as
to make Wellington believe that the French would invade Portugal. He
was also to lay heavy contributions on Madrid and Toledo. In fact, the
capital was to be held only as long as it could be squeezed.

Such were the plans. They show clearly that the Emperor was impressed
with the need of crushing the rising in the north of Spain; for he
ordered as great a force against Mina and his troublesome bands as he
deemed necessary to watch the Portuguese frontier. Clausel was charged
to stamp out the northern rising, and Napoleon seems to have judged
that this hardy fighter would end this tedious task before Wellington
dealt any serious blows. The miscalculation was to be fatal. Mina was
not speedily to be beaten, nor was the British general the slow
unenterprising leader that the Emperor took him to be. And then again,
in spite of all the experiences of the past, Napoleon failed to allow
for the delays caused by the capture of his couriers, or by their long
detours. Yet, never were these more serious. Clarke's first urgent
despatch, that of January 4th, did not reach the King until February
16th.[310] When its directions were being doubtfully obeyed, those
quoted above arrived on March 12th, and led to changes in the
disposition of the troops. Thus the forces opposed to Wellington were
weakened in order to crush the northern revolt, and yet these
detachments were only sent north at the close of March for a difficult
enterprise which was not to be completed before the British leader
threw his sword decisively into the scales of war.

Joseph has been severely blamed for his tardy action: but, in truth,
he was in a hopeless _impasse_: on all sides he saw the walls of his
royal prison house closing in. The reb