ed in the clearest and most evident
form.

From now on it is not the chancelleries which must impose the
solutions of great problems; but it is the mass of the public in
Europe and America.

V

THE ANXIETIES OF THE VICTORS

We have seen the process by which the idea of the indemnity for
damages, which was not contained either in the peace declaration of
the Entente, nor in the manifestations of the various parliaments, nor
in the first armistice proposals, nor in the armistice between Italy
and Austria, was introduced in the armistice with Germany, out of pure
regard for France, without taking heed of the consequences. Three
words, said Clemenceau, only three words need be added, words which
compromise nothing and are an act of deference to France. The entire
construction of the treaties, after all, is based on those three
words.

And how fantastic the demands for compensation have become!

An old Italian proverb says, "In time of war there are more lies than
earth." Ancient and modern pottery reproduce the motto, which is
widespread, and whose truth was not understood until some years
ago. So many foolish things were said about the almost mysterious
manoeuvres of Germany, about her vast expansion, her great resources
and accumulated capital, that the reality tended to become lost to
sight.

These absurd legends, formed during the War, were not forgotten, and
there are even now many who believe in good faith that Germany can
pay, if not twenty or twenty-five milliards a year, at least eight or
nine without any difficulty.

France's shrewdest politicians, however, well knew that the demand
for an enormous and unlimited indemnity was only a means of putting
Germany under control and depressing her to the point of exhaustion.
But the others maintained this proposal more out of rancour and hatred
than from any actual political concept. It may be said that the
problem of the indemnity has never been seriously studied and that the
calculations, the valuations, the procedures, have all formed a series
of impulsive acts co-ordinated by a single error, the error of the
French politicians who had the one aim of holding Germany down.

The procedure was simple.

In the first phase the indemnities came into being from three words
inserted almost by chance into the armistice treaty on November 2,
1918, _reparation des dommages_. It was merely a matter of a simple
expression to content public feeling: _Je suppli