se sont succede au pouvoir depuis le_ 10
_janvier_, 1920," that is, after the fall of Clemenceau, accused in
turn by Poincare of being weak and feeble in asserting his demands,
"_ont compromis les droits que leur predecesseur avait fait
reconnaitre a la France_" (p. 503).

Taking into consideration Germany's financial downfall, which
threatens to upset not only all the indemnity schemes but the entire
economy of continental Europe, the state of mind which is prevalent is
not much different from that which Tardieu indicates.

It is already more than a year ago since I left the direction of the
Italian Government, and the French Press no longer accused me of being
in perfect agreement with Lloyd George, yet Poincare wrote on August
1, 1920:

_L'autre jour M. Asquith declarait au parlement britannique: "Quelque
forme de langage qu'on emploie, la conference de Spa a bien ete, en
fait, une conference pour la revision des conditions du traite."
"Chut!" a repondu M. Lloyd George: "c'est la une declaration tres
grave par l'effet qu'elle peut produire en France. Je ne puis la
laisser passer sans la contredire." Contradiction de pure forme, faite
pour courtoisie vis-a-vis de nous, mais qui malheureusement ne change
rien au fond des choses. Chaque fois que le Conseil Supreme s'est
reuni, il a laisse sur la table des deliberations quelques morceaux
epars du traite_.

No kind of high-handedness, no combined effort, will ever be able to
keep afloat absurdities like the dream of the vast indemnity, the
Polish programme, the hope of annexing the Saar, etc. As things go
there is almost more danger for the victors than for the vanquished.
He who has lost all has nothing to lose. It is rather the victorious
nations who risk all in this disorganized Europe of ours. The
conquerors arm themselves in the ratio by which the vanquished disarm,
and the worse the situation of our old enemies becomes, so much
the worse become the exchanges and the credits of the victorious
continental countries.

Yet, in some of the exaggerated ideas of France and other countries of
the Entente, there is not only the rancour and anxiety for the future,
but a sentiment of well-founded diffidence. After the War the European
States belonging to the Entente have been embarrassed not only on
account of the enormous internal debts, but also for the huge debts
contracted abroad.

If Germany had not had to pay any indemnity and had not lost her
colonies and merc