Belgium. That is to say, that Great Britain could well pay her debt
to the United States, ceding the greater part of her credits towards
France and Italy.
But the truth is that, while on the subject of the German indemnities,
stolid illusions continue to be propagated (perhaps now with greater
discretion), neither France nor Italy is in a position to pay its
debts.
The most honest solution, which, intelligently enough, J.M. Keynes has
seen from the first, is that each of the inter-allied countries should
renounce its state credits towards countries that were allies or
associates during the War. The United States of America are creditors
only; Great Britain has lent the double of what she has borrowed.
France has received on loan the triple of what she has lent to others.
The credits of France are for almost two-thirds undemandable credits
of Great Britain; more than 14 milliards being with Russia, they are
for considerably more than one-third bad debts.
France and Italy would be benefited chiefly by this provision. Great
Britain would scarcely either benefit or lose, or, rather, the benefit
accruing to her would be less in so much as her chief credits are to
Russia.
The United States would doubtless have to bear the largest burden. But
when one thinks of the small sacrifice which the United States has
made in comparison with the efforts of France and Italy (and Italy was
not obliged to enter the War), the new sacrifice demanded does not
seem excessive.
During the War the United States of America, who for three years
furnished food, provisions and arms to the countries of the Entente,
have absorbed the greater part of their available resources. Not only
are the States of Europe debtors, but so are especially the private
citizens who have contracted debts during or after the War. Great
Britain during the War had to sell at least 25 milliards of her
foreign values. The United States of America, on the contrary, have
immensely increased their reserves.
But this very increase is harmful to them, inasmuch as the capacity
for exchange of the States of Europe has been much reduced. The United
States now risk seeing still further reduced, if not destroyed,
this purchasing capacity of their best clients; and this finally
constitutes for the U.S.A. infinitely greater damage than the
renouncing of all their credits.
To reconstruct Germany, to intensify exchange of goods with the old
countries of Austria-Hungary
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