ith the United States,
with Great Britain, with Russia and with Austria-Hungary. In 1913 her
commerce with the United States represented alone little less than
two milliards and a half of marks according to the statistics of the
German Empire, and 520 millions of dollars according to the figures
of America. If we except Canada, which we may consider a territorial
continuation, the two best customers of the United States were Great
Britain and Germany. They were, moreover, the two customers whose
imports largely exceeded the exports. The downfall of Germany will
bring about inevitably a formidable crisis in the Anglo-Saxon
countries and consequent ruin in other countries.
Up to now Germany has given all she could; any further payment will
cause a downfall without changing the actual monetary position.
Germany, after a certain point, will not pay, but will drag down in
her fall the economic edifices of the victorious countries of the
Continent.
All attempts at force are useless, all impositions are sterile.
All this is true and cannot be denied, but at the same time it must
be recognized that in the first move for the indemnity there was a
reasonable cause for anxiety on the part of the Allies.
If Germany had had to pay no indemnity this absurd situation would
have come about, that although exhausted, Germany would have issued
from the War without debts abroad and could easily have got into her
stride again, while France, Italy, and in much less degree Great
Britain, would have come out of the War with heavy debts.
This anxiety was not only just and well founded, but it is easy to see
why it gave ground for a feeling of grave disquiet.
France and Italy, the two big victor States of the Continent, were
only able to carry on the War through the assistance of Great Britain
and the United States. The War would not have lasted long without the
aid of the Anglo-Saxons, which had a decisive effect.
France has obtained all she asked for, and, indeed, more than all her
previsions warranted. Italy has found herself in a difficult position.
She too has realized her territorial aspirations, though not
completely, and the assistance of her Allies has not always been
cordial.
I have had, as head of the Government, to oppose all the agitations,
and especially the Adriatic adventures, which have caused an acute
party division in Italy. From a sense of duty I have also assumed all
responsibility. But the rigidness of Wil
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