the Espionage Act of 1917.[1310] But in the famous opinion of Justice
Holmes in Schenck _v._ United States,[1311] it held that: "When a nation
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long
as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right."[1312] A State also has power to make it unlawful
to advocate that citizens of the State should not assist in prosecuting
a war against public enemies of the United States.[1313] The most
drastic restraint of personal liberty imposed during World War II was
the detention and relocation of the Japanese residents of the Western
States, including those who were native-born citizens of the United
States. When various phases of this program were challenged, the Court
held that in order to prevent espionage and sabotage, the freedom of
movement of such persons could be restricted by a curfew order,[1314]
even by a regulation excluding them from a defined area,[1315] but that
a citizen of Japanese ancestry whose loyalty was concerned could not be
detained against her will in a relocation camp.[1316]

ALIEN ENEMIES

The status of alien enemies was first considered in connection with the
passage of the Alien Act of 1798,[1317] whereby the President was
authorized to deport any alien or to license him to reside within the
United States at any place to be designated by the President. Critics of
the measure conceded its constitutionality so far as enemy aliens were
concerned, because, as Madison wrote, "The Constitution having expressly
delegated to Congress the power to declare war against any nation, and,
of course, to treat it and all its members as enemies."[1318] The
substance of this early law was reenacted during the first world war.
Under it the President is authorized, in time of war, to prescribe "the
manner and degree of the restraint to which [alien enemies] shall be
subject and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall
be permitted," or to provide for their removal from the United
States.[1319] This measure was held valid in Ludecke _v._ Watkins.[1320]

EMINENT DOMAIN

An often-cited dictum uttered shortly after the Mexican War asserted the
right of an owner to compensation for property destroyed to prevent its
falling into the hands of the enemy, or for that taken for public
use.[1321] In United States _v._ Russell,[1322] d