use has been made of "The
Constitution of the United States of America Annotated," which was
brought out under the editorship of Mr. W.C. Gilbert in 1938. Its
copious listing of cases has been especially valuable. Its admirable
Tables of Contents and Index have furnished a model for those of the
present volume. If this model has been approximated the contents of this
volume ought to be readily accessible despite its size. The coverage of
the volume ends with the cases decided June, 1952.

A personal word or two must be added. The Editor was invited to
undertake this project by Dr. Ernest S. Griffith, Director of the
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, and his
constant interest in the progress of our labors has been a tremendous
source of encouragement. To his able collaborators the Editor will not
attempt to express his appreciation--they share with him the credit for
such merits as the work possesses and responsibility for its short
comings. And I am sure that they join me in thanking Miss Evelyn K.
Mayhugh for her skill and devotion in aiding us at every step in our
common task.

Edward S. Corwin.

INTRODUCTION

It is my purpose in this Introduction to the _Constitution of the United
States, Annotated_ to sketch rapidly certain outstanding phases of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution for the illustration
they may afford of the interests, ideas, and contingencies which have
from time to time influenced the Court in this still supremely important
area of its powers and of the comparable factors which give direction to
its work in the same field at the present time.

As employed in this country, Constitutional Law signifies a body of
rules resulting from the interpretation by a high court of a written
constitutional instrument in the course of disposing of cases in which
the validity, in relation to the constitutional instrument, of some act
of governmental power, State or national, has been challenged. This
function, conveniently labelled "Judicial Review," involves the power
and duty on the part of the Court of pronouncing void any such act which
does not square with its own reading of the constitutional instrument.
Theoretically, therefore, it is a purely juristic product, and as such
does not alter the meaning. To those who hold this theory, the Court
does not elaborate the instrument, as legislative power might; it
elucidates it, bringing forth into the light o