n particulars was
designed as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently used. The
different mode of expression employed in the constitution, in regard to
the two powers, the legislative and the executive, serves to confirm
this inference. In the article which gives the legislative powers of the
government, the expressions are, 'All legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a congress of the United States.' In that which
grants the executive power, the expressions are, 'The _executive power_
shall be vested in a President of the United States.' The enumeration
ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the
principal articles implied in the definition of executive power; leaving
the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in
conformity with other parts of the Constitution, and with the principles
of free government. The general doctrine of our Constitution then is,
that the _executive power_ of the nation is vested in the President;
subject only to the _exceptions_ and _qualifications_, which are
expressed in the instrument."[8]
THE MYERS CASE
These enlarged conceptions of the executive power clause have been
ratified by the Supreme Court within recent times. In the Myers case,[9]
decided in 1926, not only was Madison's contention as to the location
of the removal power adopted, and indeed extended, but Hamilton's
general theory as to the proper mode of construing the clause was
unqualifiedly endorsed. Said Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court:
"The executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by
specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was
limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed, * * *"[10]
THE CURTISS-WRIGHT CASE
Ten years later Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court in United
States _v._ Curtiss-Wright Corporation,[11] joined Hamilton's conception
of the President's role in the foreign relations field to the conception
that in this field the National Government is not one of enumerated but
of inherent powers;[12] and the practical conclusion he drew was that
the constitutional objection to delegation of legislative power does not
apply to a delegation by Congress to the President of its "cognate"
powers in this field; that, in short, the merged powers of the two
departments may be put at the President's disposal whenever Congress so
desires.[13]
Nor is it alone in the field of foreig
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