y.

[Footnote 11: Mr. Nelson, author of "The Feasts and Fasts of the Church
of England."]

The force of his argument turned upon this; that the laws made by the
supreme power, cannot otherwise than by the supreme power be annulled:
That this consisting in England of a King, Lords, and Commons, whereof
each have a negative voice, no two of them can repeal or enact a law
without consent of the third; much less may any one of them be entirely
excluded from its part of the legislature by a vote of the other two.
That all these maxims were openly violated at the Revolution; where an
assembly of the nobles and people, not summoned by the king's writ
(which was an essential part of the constitution) and consequently no
lawful meeting, did merely upon their own authority, declare the king to
have abdicated, the throne vacant, and gave the crown by a vote to a
nephew, when there were three children to inherit; though by the
fundamental laws of the realm the next heir is immediately to succeed.
Neither does it appear how a prince's abdication can make any other sort
of vacancy in the throne, than would be caused by his death, since he
cannot abdicate for his children (who claim their right of succession by
act of parliament) otherwise than by his own consent in form to a bill
from the two houses.

And this is the difficulty that seems chiefly to stick with the most
reasonable of those, who from a mere scruple of conscience refuse to
join with us upon the revolution principle; but for the rest, are I
believe as far from loving arbitrary government, as any others can be,
who are born under a free constitution, and are allowed to have the
least share of common good sense.

In this objection there are two questions included: First, whether upon
the foot of our constitution, as it stood in the reign of the late King
James, a king of England may be deposed? The second is, whether the
people of England convened by their own authority, after the king had
withdrawn himself in the manner he did, had power to alter the
succession?

As for the first; it is a point I shall not presume to determine, and
shall therefore only say, that to any man who holds the negative, I
would demand the liberty of putting the case as strongly as I please. I
will suppose a prince limited by laws like ours, yet running into a
thousand caprices of cruelty like Nero or Caligula. I will suppose him
to murder his mother and his wife, to commit incest, to ravis