sy to see that after each of
the senses has sent in its report something more is necessary: the
combining of them all together in the same place and at the same
time, the bringing up of an appropriate name, and with that a sort of
relating or distinguishing of this group of sensations from those of
the apple. Only then can we say that the knowledge, "here is an
orange," has been reached. Now this is the _one typical way the mind
has of acting_, this combining of all the items or groups of items
into ever larger and more fruitful combinations. This is called
Apperception. The mind, we say, "apperceives" the orange when it is
able to treat all the separate sensations together as standing for one
thing. And the various circumstances under which the mind does this
give the occasions for the different names which the earlier
psychology used for marking off different "faculties."
These names are still convenient, however, and it may serve to make
the subject clear, as well as to inform the reader of the meaning of
these terms, to show how they all refer to this one kind of mental
action.
The case of the orange illustrates what is usually called Perception.
It is the case in which the result is the knowledge of an actual
object in the outside world. When the same process goes on after the
actual object has been removed it is Memory. When it goes on again in
a way which is not controlled by reference to such an outside
object--usually it is a little fantastic, as in dreams or fancy, but
often it is useful as being so well done as to anticipate what is
really true in the outside world--then it is Imagination. If it is
actually untrue, but still believed in, we call it Illusion or
Hallucination. When it uses mere symbols, such as words, gestures,
writing, etc., to stand for whole groups of things, it is Thinking or
Reasoning. So we may say that what the mind arrives at through this
its one great way of acting, no matter which of these forms it takes
on, except in the cases in which it is not true in its results to the
realities, is Knowledge.
Thus we see that the terms and faculties of the older psychology can
be arranged under this doctrine of Apperception without the necessity
of thinking of the mind as doing more than the one thing. It simply
groups and combines its material in different ways and in ever higher
degrees of complexity.
Apperception, then, is the one principle of mental activity on the
side of its recep
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