mind's
activity which have been distinguished above as all illustrating
Apperception--e.g., the stages known as Perception, Imagination,
Reasoning, etc.
We act, of course, on our perceptions constantly; most of our routine
life is made up of such action on the perceptions of objects which lie
about us. The positions of things in the house, in the streets, in the
office, in the store, are so well known that we carry out a series of
actions with reference to these objects without much supervision from
our consciousness. Here the law of Motor Suggestion works along under
the guidance of Perception, Memory, and the Association of Ideas. Then
we find also, in much of our action, an element due to the exercise of
the Imagination. We fill in the gaps in the world of perception by
imagining appropriate connections; and we then act as if we knew that
these imaginations were realities. This is especially true in our
intercourse with our fellow-men. We never really know what they will
do from time to time. Their action is still future and uncertain; but
from our familiarity with their character, we surmise or imagine what
they expect or think, and we then act so as to make our conduct fit
into theirs. Here is suggestion of a personal kind which depends upon
our ability, in a sense, to reconstruct the character of others,
leading us out into appropriate action. This is the sphere of the most
important affairs of our lives. It appears especially so when we
consider its connection with the next great sort of action from
suggestion.
This next and highest sphere is action from the general or abstract
thoughts which we have been able to work up by the apperceiving
activity of the mind. In this sphere we have a special name for those
thoughts which influence us directly and lead us to action: we call
such thoughts Motives. We also have a special name for the sort of
action which is prompted by clearly-thought-out motives: Will. But in
spite of this emphasis given to certain actions of ours as springing
from what is called Will, we must be careful to see that Will is not a
new faculty, or capacity, added to mind, and which is different from
the ways of action which the mind had before the Will arose. Will is
only a name for the action upon suggestions of conduct which are so
clear in our minds that we are able to deliberate upon them, acting
only after some reflection, and so having a sense that the action
springs from our own choic
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