lly at its frustrated attempts of the
preceding winter, and it was inclined to place the responsibility for
this failure upon Great Britain and France. "The President's judgment,"
wrote Colonel House on August 4, 1915, three months after the
_Lusitania_ went down, "was that last autumn was the time to discuss
peace parleys, and we both saw present possibilities. War is a great
gamble at best, and there was too much at stake in this one to take
chances. I believe if one could have started peace parleys in November,
we could have forced the evacuation of both France and Belgium, and
finally forced a peace which would have eliminated militarism on land
and sea. The wishes of the Allies were heeded with the result that the
war has now fastened itself upon the vitals of Europe and what the end
may be is beyond the knowledge of man."

This shows that the efforts which the Administration was making were not
casual or faint-hearted, but that they represented a most serious
determination to bring hostilities to an end. This letter and the
correspondence which now took place with Page also indicate the general
terms upon which the Wilson Administration believed that the mighty
differences could be composed. The ideas which Colonel House now set
forth were probably more the President's than his own; he was merely the
intermediary in their transmission. They emphasized Mr. Wilson's
conviction that a decisive victory on either side would be a misfortune
for mankind. As early as August, 1914, this was clearly the conviction
that underlay all others in the President's interpretation of events.
His other basic idea was that militarism should come to an end "on land
and sea"; this could mean nothing except that Germany was expected to
abandon its army and that Great Britain was to abandon its navy.

_From Edward M. House_
115 East 53rd Street,
New York City.
January 4th, 1915.

DEAR PAGE:

I believe the Dual Alliance is thoroughly ready for peace and I
believe they would be willing to agree upon terms England would
accept provided Russia and France could be satisfied.

They would, in my opinion, evacuate both Belgium and France and
indemnify the former, and they would, I think, be willing to begin
negotiations upon a basis looking to permanent peace.

It would surprise me if the Germans did not come out in the open
soon and declare that they have always been for pe