t to deprive the Allies of their victory
and as an effort to assist Germany in escaping the consequences of her
crimes. Combined with this stout popular resolve, however, there was a
lack of confidence in the Asquith ministry. An impression was broadcast
that it was pacifist, even "defeatist," in its thinking, and that it
harboured a weak humanitarianism which was disposed to look gently even
upon the behaviour of the Prussians. The masses suspected that the
ministry would welcome a peace with Germany which would mean little more
than a cessation of hostilities and which would leave the great problems
of the war unsolved. That this opinion was unjust, that, on the
contrary, the British Foreign Office was steadily resisting all attempts
to end the war on an unsatisfactory basis, Page's correspondence,
already quoted, abundantly proves, but this unreasoning belief did
prevail and it was an important factor in the situation. This is the
reason why the British Cabinet regarded Colonel House's visit at that
time with positive alarm. It feared that, should the purpose become
known, the British public and press would conclude that the Government
had invited a peace discussion. Had any such idea seized the popular
mind in February and March, 1915, a scandal would have developed which
would probably have caused the downfall of the Asquith Ministry. "Don't
fool yourself about peace," Page writes to his son Arthur, about this
time. "If any one should talk about peace, or doves, or ploughshares
here, they'd shoot him."

Colonel House reached London early in February and was soon in close
consultation with the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey. He made a
great personal success; the British statesmen gained a high regard for
his disinterestedness and his general desire to serve the cause of
decency among nations; but he made little progress in his peace plans,
simply because the facts were so discouraging and so impregnable. Sir
Edward repeated to him what he had already said to Page many times: that
Great Britain was prepared to discuss a peace that would really
safeguard the future of Europe, but was not prepared to discuss one that
would merely reinstate the regime that had existed before 1914. The fact
that the Germans were not ready to accept such a peace made discussion
useless. Disappointed at this failure, Colonel House left for Berlin.
His letters to Page show that the British judgment of Germany was not
unjust and that the